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Employee theft is believed to transfer  between $15 and $56 billion per year 
from businesses to their workers and to account for between 5% and 30% 
of business failures each year!  1  These numbers can be placed in perspective 
by noting that federal corporate income tax revenues in fiscal year 1987 
were $104 billion and that the financial cost of street crime is estimated at 
approximately $4 billion (Arnold 1985). 
Employee pilferage is especially conspicuous in some industries. It is 
believed that 80% of shipping losses in the freight shipping and airport 
cargo handling industries arise from employee theft (Willis 1986). Forty- 
two percent of all retail shrinkage, which averages 1.8% of sales, is due to 
employee  theft according to  a  1986-87  survey of  113 retailers (Arthur 
Young and Company, 1987). Hollinger and Clark (1983) find that about 
30% of retail employees misuse discount privileges or directly steal mer- 
chandise from their employers, 27% of hospital employees take hospital 
supplies at least once  a year, and about 9%  of manufacturing workers 
falsify their time cards. It has also been estimated that unauthorized use 
of the federal long-distance telephone system by employees inflates the 
federal phone bill by $89.5 million a year (Lipman and McGraw 1988). 
While some employee theft is sanctioned as a form of compensation, a 
great deal of  employee  crime and shirking, including, most  obviously, 
sabotage and vandalism, almost certainly does not represent an efficient 
transfer  from firms to workers. An extreme example of inefficient employee 
"time theft" comes from the Peach Bottom nuclear power plant, which 
was  fined  $1.35 million (New York  Times,  August 12, 1988) and is expected 
to be closed for over 20 months because  of an inability to control widespread 
sleeping in the control room (Wald 1988). This closure has resulted in the 
owners "spending about $14 million a month for replacement power, most 
of the cost borne by stockholders." 
To our knowledge,  employee  crime has received little attention from 
economists. This is unfortunate. Employee theft provides a natural testing 
ground for economic  theories of principal-agent relationships generally 
and of crime specifically. In his seminal analysis of the economics of crime, 
Gary Becker (1968) pointed out that the cost of achieving any given degree 
of deterrence is minimized by combining an infinitesimal probability of 
detection and an arbitrarily  large punishment. One might expect this strat- 
egy to better describe employers' responses to employee malfeasance than 
'An  American Management Association study reported in Hollinger and Clark 
(1983, p. 3) estimated that in 1975 employee theft (employee pilferage, kickbacks 
and bribery, fraud, and embezzlement)  cost  businesses between  $17.5 and $29 
billion. These figures were converted to 1987 dollars by the Gross National Product 
deflator yielding a range of $34 to $56 billion. Shepard  and Dutson ( 1988) conclude 
from a review of the existing literature that a conservative estimate of the annual 
economic  losses of U.S. businesses from employee theft ranges from $15 to $25 
billion. Evidence on the role of internal theft in business failures is discussed by 
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it does the law enforcement behavior of governments, whose actions are 
constrained by notions  of fundamental fairness and constitutional limi- 
tations  that  punishments  should  be set to "fit  the crime."  Indeed,  Mirrlees 
(1974)  showed  that the "burn them in oil" solution  arises naturally in 
certain principal-agent models. Moreover, employee crime is perhaps the 
most vivid, although not the most important, form of employee shirking. 
It can therefore shed light on  efficiency-wage theories in which  effort- 
elicitation considerations may lead firms to pay premium (rent-generating) 
wages (e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). 
This article offers some observations on employee crime, economic the- 
ories of crime, limits on bonding, and the efficiency-wage hypothesis. We 
begin by demonstrating  that the simplest economic theories of crime predict 
that profit-maximizing firms should follow strategies analogous to Kolm's 
(1973) recommendation that an optimizing government should "hang tax 
evaders with probability zero." Finding overwhelming empirical evidence 
that firms expend considerable resources trying to detect employee mal- 
feasance, we investigate a number of possible reasons why the simple mod- 
el's predictions fail. It turns out that some of the plausible explanations 
for firms'  large outlays on monitoring of employees also justify the payment 
of premium wages. A priori arguments that firms should not pay efficiency 
wages become much weaker once it is recognized that these firms expend 
significant resources on monitoring.' 
Section I lays out the simplest formal model of employee crime. Section 
II discusses a number of respects in which this model is clearly inadequate 
as an explanation for observed personnel practices. Section III examines 
a number of possible reasons for the model's failure. Section IV discusses 
the implications of our analysis for the efficiency-wage hypothesis. Section 
V concludes this article. 
I.  A Formal  Model 
We illustrate our basic argument by considering a firm's decision about 
monitoring intensity,  wages,  and bonding in a simple  1-period model. 
Consider a very simple form of employee shirking/"crime"-failing  to 
supply the effort contracted for by the firm (or analogously stealing an 
equivalent amount of output).  At the beginning of the period workers 
may post a bond b. During the period, they may or may not supply effort 
e, which takes on the value one if effort is supplied and zero otherwise. 
Workers, whose only source of income is employment, maximize a utility 
function-U  = C +  (1 -  e) where C represents consumption. The prob- 
ability of  a shirking worker being detected is given by p(m)  where m 
represents  outlays on monitoring. We assume that p' > 0, p" <  0, and that 
2This point has been noted before by Eaton and White (1983) and Bulow and 
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p(O)  =  p*  >  0.3  If workers  are caught  shirking,  they forfeit their bond 
and do not receive the wage w. However, they are immediately employed 
elsewhere and earn the reservation wage, r, r >  1. If they are not caught 
shirking, they receive the wage and their bond is returned. 
It is apparent that it always pays the firm to make arrangements that 
induce its labor force to  work  rather than to  shirk. The  only  possible 
equilibria are those in which e =  1. The firm's problem is 
max Y =  R(L)  -  (w  +  m)L,  (1) 
with respect to L, w, m, and b, and subject to the constraints that 
w  2  r,  (la) 
w + b  1 +  [1  -p(m)](w  + b) + p(m)r,  (lb) 
m  20  (1c) 
where Y represents the firm's income, L represents labor input and R(L) 
is revenue net of nonlabor costs. The first constraint implies that the firm 
must pay its workers at least the reservation wage. The second is the no- 
shirk condition requiring that given the wage, monitoring intensity, and 
posted bond, workers prefer to work rather than to shirk. The third con- 
straint guarantees that monitoring expenditures are nonnegative. 
Exhibiting the first-order conditions to the firm's problem is not very 
informative. It is straightforward to show that the solution to (1) is given 
by 
m = 0O  (2a) 
w = r,  (2b) 
b 2  /p*  (2c) 
This solution is clearly feasible. To see that it is optimal, one may note 
that (la)  requires that w be as great as r, (1c)  insures that m cannot be 
negative, and that the bond b does not enter the firm's objective func- 
tion  (I). 
Although  we  have analyzed a simple single-period model  with  risk- 
neutral workers, the basic result that firms should not spend resources on 
3Ths  guarantees  that,  even if the firm  spends  no money on monitoring,  there 
is a positive  probability  that  shirking  workers  will be detected.  This simplifies  the 
proof  and  seems  reasonable  since  normal  management  coordination  activities  should 
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monitoring workers when bonding is unrestricted is easily shown to be 
valid in multiperiod settings. Indeed, the possibility of basing wages on 
seniority actually eases the firm's effort-elicitation problem (Lazear 1981). 
The basic conclusions of this section also follow  when workers are risk 
averse as long as inspection errors in which the firm falsely identifies in- 
nocent workers as shirkers are not a major problem. We address this latter 
issue below. 
II.  The Pervasiveness  of  Monitoring  and Employee  Crime 
Cursory inspection of almost any workplace indicates that firms expend 
substantial resources monitoring employees, and that much of this mon- 
itoring activity is aimed at deterring shirking and stealing by workers. Data 
from the 1983 Current Population Survey (CPS) indicate that, even under 
a fairly narrow definition of supervisory  jobs, approximately  7% of workers 
in the U.S. nonagricultural, private sector are employed as supervisors or 
inspectors.4  Even if a small fraction of their time were devoted to controlling 
worker misconduct, such expenditures would  be quite substantial. Fur- 
thermore, a recent survey indicates that U.S. businesses spend approxi- 
mately $12 billion a year on  security products, personnel, and services, 
and that a major concern in budgeting these expenditures is the control 
of employee crime (Whitehurst 1987). Arthur  Young and Company (1986) 
report that a group of 168 large retailers spent an average of 0.42% of sales 
on security and loss prevention in 1985 and that employee theft was the 
largest component of the inventory losses these expenditures attempted 
to control. The Bank of America utilizes "20  people, a lot of computer 
software and about $1 million a year" to keep tabs on the 3,500 employees 
in its credit card division (Dolan  1985, p. 15). 
Furthermore,  there is some evidence that the intensity of monitoring is 
increasing over time. In 1974, only 10% of Fortune 1000 companies used 
undercover security agents. By 1983, the incidence had increased to 50% 
(Lipman and McGraw 1988). Shepard  and Duston (1988) report that em- 
ployer demand for guard and investigative services is expected to increase 
rapidly through the early 1990s because of growing business concern over 
employee theft, drug abuse, and similar problems. 
In gauging the extent of monitoring outlays, there is the obvious problem 
that supervisors  produce a joint product: they both deter shirking and help 
to organize production. One striking example suggesting the presence of 
more than minimal monitoring to deter employee cheating is the typical 
company's treatment of  employee  expense  accounts. Rather than spot 
checking these accounts and attaching large penalties to detected abuses, 
4We  classified  as  supervisors  employees  in the  following  three-digit  1980 Census 
of Population  occupation  codes:  35-36, 243, 303-306, 413-415, 433, 448, 456, 485, 
489, 494, 497, 503, 553-558, 613, 633, 689-693,  796, 803, and  843. 336  Dickens  et al. 
firms inspect to at least some degree every request that is submitted. Fur- 
thermore, many firms hire outside accountants who periodically audit the 
company's financial records to prevent frauds and thefts committed by 
managers with the aid of staff accountants or bookkeepers. It is difficult 
to view these activities as costless byproducts  of supervisory  activities aimed 
at increasing the efficiency of production. 
As noted in the introduction, despite this extensive monitoring the level 
of employee crime is considerable. Firms appear to be unwilling to adopt 
a level of  deterrence sufficient to deter employee  deviant behavior. An 
excellent example is provided by their response to frequent  flyer programs.5 
When firms pay for their employees' travel, any discounts logically belong 
to the firm. Moreover, when employees receive rewards for traveling on 
particular airlines, they may make travel decisions which are not in the 
best interest of the firm. Experts estimate that firms could save up to $3 
billion annually by recovering their employees' travel awards. While one 
major oil  company has three clerks who  spend all their time claiming 
bonus awards for corporate use, it appears that most major companies 
have given up the effort to collect bonus miles because the costs outweigh 
the potential benefits. None have tried to ensure compliance by announcing 
a program of spot checks and severe penalties as would be suggested by 
our simple model. 
It might be argued that what is labeled employee crime simply reflects 
an efficient transfer of resources from the firm to the worker. Wages may 
be reduced to offset anticipated employee cheating. While this is clearly 
true in some contexts (e.g., workers drinking the remaining wine from a 
company function), this is unlikely to be the whole story. The extra travel 
costs to companies of their employees arranging  flights to capture frequent 
flyer miles almost certainly is greater than the value of the bonus trips 
earned by employees. A shirking manager may impose costs on the firm 
far greater than his personal gains.6  The efficient-compensation argument 
is also not appropriate  when workers steal supplies that they need to expend 
considerable resources to sell. 
III.  Explaining  Monitoring  and Employee  Crime 
The pervasiveness of monitoring outlays and employee crime makes it 
apparent that some important consideration is omitted from our statement 
of the firm's problem. We first examine a modification of (1) in which it 
may be efficient for firms to expend resources  monitoring workers although 
there are no  constraints on  bonding. Finding this to  be an incomplete 
explanation, we then take up four possible considerations that may limit 
5  This discussion  of frequent  flyer  programs  is based  on Brancatelli  (1985). 
6 This point is emphasized  by Klein  (1980). Employee  Crime  and  Monitoring  337 
bonding: liquidity constraints, firm moral hazard, legal restrictions on the 
form of contracts, and social limits on enforceability.7 
False Positives and Worker Risk Aversion 
Polinsky and Shavell (1979) have suggested that if there is a risk of false 
detection and citizens are risk averse, a strategy of low  expenditures on 
detection and large penalties for alleged offenders will not maximize most 
standard social welfare functions even though that strategy conserves on 
law enforcement resources. In parallel fashion, one can argue that firms 
expend money monitoring workers to insure them against being falsely 
labeled as shirkers and having to forfeit their bonds. Positive monitoring 
outlays and smaller bonds may be optimal because of the high wage nec- 
essary to compensate workers for the risk of having a large bond erro- 
neously forfeited. 
We doubt that this consideration explains a substantial part of actual 
monitoring activities. As long as it is possible for firms to maintain some 
positive probability, no matter how small, of detecting shirking workers 
without risking false positives, firms should not spend resources on mon- 
itoring; they should instead require large bonds. Indeed, even if workers 
are risk averse and inspection errors are possible, Nalebuff and Scharfstein 
(1987) and Bolton (1987) show that as long as accurate  (but not necessarily 
perfectly accurate) tests are available and large penalties are feasible, there 
is still no reason to spend more than an infinitesimal  amount on monitoring. 
Experience with improved monitoring technologies casts doubt on the 
hypothesis that they largely benefit workers by insuring  them against  unjust 
dismissal. More accurate monitoring by computers is so strenuously ob- 
jected to by workers that there have been recent attempts to introduce 
legislation in Congress to restrict employer use of computer-based per- 
formance-monitoring technologies. 
Limits on Bonding 
A natural way to modify the problem stated in equations (1) so that it 
has a plausible solution is to add a constraint on the size of bonds-b  '  b * 
<  1/p*.  This additional constraint will bind. The no-shirk condition (lb) 
There is a further traditional objection to the low detection probability/large 
penalty approach to deterrence. If maximum penalties are exacted for minor in- 
fractions, people  have no  incentive to commit  minor rather than major crimes 
(Stigler 1970). If a thief is executed for taking $10, he might as well take $10,000. 
Marginal  deterrence requires  marginal punishments. We have difficulty seeing how 
creating marginal deterrence of more extreme forms of shirking could be an im- 
portant consideration leading firms to closely monitor workers. If there are no 
limits on bonds, firms can set bonds large enough to deter any type of shirking 
without expending resources on monitoring. Firms could also create marginal de- 
terrence by making the fraction of the bond forfeited a function of the seriousness 
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directly  implies  that, in the presence  of this constraint  on the size of the 
bond, either the firm will pay wage premia  or spend on monitoring  or 
both. We observe spending on monitoring. If workers are heterogeneous 
in their shirk-and-theft propensities and these differences are not perfectly 
observed by employers, many firms are unlikely to find it profitable to 
increase wages and/or  their monitoring intensities high enough to deter 
all worker malfeasance when bonds are limited. In this case, we are likely 
to observe the occurrence of shirking and employee crime. We would also 
see firms expending resources on  screening workers to determine their 
trustworthiness. In fact, background checks, psychological tests, and poly- 
graph tests are widely used in some industries to try to screen out "theft- 
prone" individuals. The problem then is to explain limits on bonds. Below 
we consider several possible causes for such limits. 
Liquidity Constraints 
Perhaps the most direct explanation for the failure of workers to post 
bonds is that they lack sufficient  cash and are liquidity constrained.  Workers 
cannot post  bonds with  liquid assets that they do not  have. A  similar 
argument is often used to explain why societies rely on prisons rather than 
fines to punish criminals. While superficially plausible, this argument must 
confront an immediate question. Even if perfect bonding is not possible, 
why do firms not take at least some cash from newly hired workers or at 
least set initial wages to zero? If liquidity constraints were the only limi- 
tation on bonding, firms would  ask workers for whatever up-front pay- 
ments workers could make-at  least up to the point where workers' res- 
ervation utility  constraint is exactly  satisfied (Carmichael  1985).  Most 
workers have at least some liquid assets. Yet explicit, up-front bonds and 
entrance fees appear  to be quite rare  in practice. Thus, liquidity constraints 
do not appear to provide an adequate explanation for limits on bonding. 
Firm Moral Hazard 
A second standard reason why firms cannot rely fully on bonds is firm 
moral hazard. Once a bond is posted, a firm has a strong incentive to label 
a worker a shirker and to claim his bond. Similarly, when inspections can 
generate false positives, firms may be unable to commit to a low rate of 
inspections  once  a large bond is posted  (Bolton  1987).  Except for the 
unlikely event that third parties can be relied on to accurately determine 
whether a worker has shirked, workers will be willing to post bonds only 
if they are convinced that the firm will not take these bonds under false 
pretense. When workers are uncertain of the trustworthiness of firms, they 
are unlikely to be willing to post large bonds. 
It is often suggested (e.g., Carmichael 1985) that the use of third parties 
can circumvent these moral-hazard difficulties. The likelihood of firm de- 
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default. For example, baseball  teams fine their players but give the proceeds 
to charity. But a moment's thought makes it clear that third-party  payments 
do not really eliminate the firm's moral-hazard problem. Imagine that if 
a worker is deemed to have shirked, his bond will go to the Red Cross, 
to whom his employer is indifferent.  The employer can nonetheless benefit 
by threatening  to forfeit the worker's bond unless the worker works harder, 
accepts poorer conditions, or agrees to work for a lower wage in the future. 
The point is simple. Would the reader  be willing to entrust us with $10,000 
even if we could not keep it but could only give it to charity? If we were 
well positioned to ask for a favor, it seems unlikely. Firm moral-hazard 
considerations will thus limit not only simple bonding arrangements but 
also arrangements  that include third parties.8 
It seems clear that moral-hazard  considerations  do place some constraint 
on the size of bonds that firms can ask their workers to post.9 But we 
doubt that this constraint binds for the typical employer. If firm moral- 
hazard constraints often bound, we would expect large, established firms 
with significant reputations to pay lower wages (net of the bond)  than 
small, less established firms. On  the contrary, large firms appear to pay 
higher wages at all experience levels (Brown and Medoff, in press). Perhaps 
there are limits on the size of bonds that bind before reputation constraints 
are reached for many firms. 
Legal Restrictions on Contracts 
There is the further issue of what types of contracts governments will 
enforce. An important aspect of American and English common  law is 
the refusal of the courts to enforce contract provisions that are found to 
be "penalties." In particular, contract provisions calling for "liquidated 
damages"  for breach of contract that exceed the loss caused by the breach 
are viewed as penalties and not enforced.'0  When the detection probability 
8 Note that the problems  with third-party  schemes  are not avoided  by using a 
workers'  colleagues  as the third  party  as suggested  by the burgeoning  literature  on 
tournaments (e.g., Malcolmson 1984). 
9  Moreover, if firm moral hazard limits bonds, it also limits efficiency-wage pay- 
ments since, with finite-horizon contracts, efficiency-wage earnings profiles involve 
a large lump-sum payment at the end of the contract (Akerlof and Katz, in press). 
10 Posner (1972, p. 59), in his discussion of contract law, writes: "The law permits 
parties to a contract to specify in advance the damages to be assessed in the event 
of a breach. Their specification will  be enforced unless the court finds that the 
parties'  intention was to impose a penalty rather  than to estimate the actual  damages 
caused by the breach." The current practice of courts with respect to liquidated 
damages is codified in  the Restatement (Second)  of  Contracts (cited  in Ferris 
[1982]):  "A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable 
on  grounds of public policy  as a penalty." Farber (1980)  notes that under this 
"penalty doctrine" courts will not award supercompensatory damages that exceed 
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is low, performance bonds far in excess of the actual damage done to the 
firm by any particular  episode of detected worker shirking may be required 
to provide adequate deterrence. Contracts in which workers forfeit large, 
explicit bonds when  caught shirking are unlikely to be enforced by the 
courts. This legal limitation on the size of penalties means that firms will 
need to expend resources on monitoring to raise detection probabilities." 
It is interesting to note that the termination of an employee for shirking 
is not typically viewed as a "penalty"  by the courts. Firms have traditionally 
been able to fire employees at will even if lost seniority pay exceeds any 
damage caused by employee  shirking. The termination of an employee 
known to shirk is viewed as a legitimate business decision since the em- 
ployee may be expected to shirk again in the future. On the other hand, 
if a firm tried to deter shirking by making a worker explicitly post a large, 
up-front performance bond, the courts would be likely to treat the con- 
fiscation of the bond from a worker caught shirking as an unenforceable 
penalty. 
A seemingly strong case for attributing the absence of bonds to legal 
limitations comes from an examination of the history of penal clauses in 
contracts. Penal bonds, in which the entire amount of the bond was due 
immediately upon a breach regardless of the actual damage caused by the 
breach, were commonly used to secure performance of contracts in early 
English legal history (Ferris 1982). Courts, however, often intervened to 
mitigate the harsh results  where the breach  did not cause any actual  damage. 
The legal gymnastics that succeeded in nullifying the required forfeiture 
of a "pound of flesh" for contractual breach in The Merchant of Venice 
provides a vivid dramatization of the unwillingness of courts to enforce 
"inequitable"  penal bonds even in this time period. Eventually, legislatures 
in both England and the United States prohibited the use of penal bonds. 
Beyond the general prohibition of penal bonds, there are  various specific 
prohibitions of practices that look like bonding in both the housing and 
labor markets. Despite the plausible efficiency case that could be made for 
a rich variety of  contracts, most American jurisdictions have laws that 
prevent landlords from asking their tenants for more than 1 or 2 months' 
rent as a security deposit. Explicit legal rules regarding the labor market 
prohibit the actions most like those that firms utilizing a strategy of low 
detection probabilities and large penalties would pursue. The most natural 
way for a firm to implement a strategy of bonding through deferred pay- 
ments would  be to have an unvested pension. Yet firms are required to 
vest pensions after a certain number of years. Actions to dismiss highly 
paid senior workers and replace them with younger ones are often subject 
to legal challenge in the United States (especially since the passage of the 
t  Farber (1980) argues analogously that the prohibition of supercompensatory 
damages in commercial transactions also leads to excessive levels of breach and 
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Age Discrimination Act of 1978) and are unthinkable in parts of Western 
Europe. 
The frequent unwillingness  of many societies to enforce contracts in 
which one party is empowered to "punish" another is somewhat myste- 
rious. Even parties with very unequal strengths should be able to write 
efficient contracts. Limiting one type of provision hardly seems to do much 
to protect "weak" parties to contracts.12 
The common law restriction of supercompensatory liquidated damages 
is often explained by suggesting that it is desirable to avoid incentives for 
"induced breach," situations where one party to a contract tries to get 
another to breach it. The unenforceability of penalty clauses may also save 
on transaction costs by saving transactors the costs of "reading the fine 
print" of a contract to determine whether it contains a hidden penalty for 
breach. Furthermore, as Becker and Stigler (1974)  argue, large penalties 
attached to dismissal will generate costly attempts by employees to litigate 
against efforts to fire them. Since parties are not fully charged for court 
services in resolving disputes, and since courts cannot abdicate completely 
from disputes involving liquidated  damages  provisions, the socially efficient 
outcome may be simply not to enforce such provisions. 
These arguments raise the possibility that legal restrictions may help 
explain why firms devote resources to monitoring and rely on termination 
threats rather than cash penalties to deter inappropriate behavior by their 
workers.13 Perhaps these laws reflect broader social sentiments that would 
constrain  employer behavior  even in the absence of formal legal restrictions. 
Social Limits on Bonding 
While legal constraints on penal bonds may not fully explain the absence 
of  bonds,  they  nevertheless reflect a widely  shared opposition  to  such 
contractual arrangements. Individuals in charge of enforcing the use of 
punitive measures will be reluctant to punish workers if the punishment 
exceeds the crime. Firms are also reluctant to use certain punishment strat- 
egies because of their adverse effects on the attitudes and performance of 
nonshirking workers and on  their public image. We suspect that these 
''enforcement"  problems are the most empirically  important considerations 
limiting the use of performance bonds. 
Carr-Hill and Stern (1979),  in an analysis of the criminal law which 
closely parallels our analysis of the employment relation, conclude that a 
12 On the other  hand,  restrictions  against  penalties  have  been  justified  under  the 
doctrine  of unconscionability  as protecting  parties  who may  have  signed  contracts 
under  duress  (Rea 1984). 
13 However,  there  are  some  problems  with this  view. If the "penalty  clause  con- 
straint"  bound  frequently,  we would  expect  to see  a large  caseload  defining  precisely 
its limits  in labor  contracts.  In fact, outside  of cases  involving  the termination  of 
franchises,  the penalty  clause  issue  appears  to have  aroused  a small  caseload  and 
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positive theory of criminal  law enforcement  must include a cost of departing 
from the socially determined appropriate punishment. The same consid- 
erations of fairness that limit the punishments society imposes for criminal 
offenses also limit society's willingness to enforce contracts in which per- 
sons put themselves at the mercy of other private parties. These consid- 
erations are particularly important in limiting firms' ability to discipline, 
fine, and discharge workers. 
In a classic discussion of the influence of  criminal law on  industrial 
penalties, Sanford Kadish (1964, p. 125) notes that "the criminal law and 
the process of disciplining employees for unsatisfactory conduct are peas 
from the same pod; that as a consequence each system gives rise to fun- 
damental issues which are essentially similar." Kadish (p. 127) argues that 
"punishment  must serve  to accomplish its purposes at a cost to an individual 
which is not regarded as excessive" and that punishments that violate this 
condition will be viewed as "arbitrary  and unfair." If punishments appear 
excessive relative to the offense, as is likely to  be the case when  firms 
follow  a low monitoring intensity/high  penalty strategy, these penalties 
will tend to be nullified in practice by persons charged with the admin- 
istration of the discipline system and may create such a sense of injustice 
as to damage the firm's relations with its employees. 
Akerlof (1982)  follows  dozens of personnel textbooks in stressing the 
importance of reciprocal  good will (gift exchange) in maintaining  employee 
morale and efficient production. Firms may find that asking workers to 
post bonds may signify a lack of trust and may negatively affect workers' 
morale and productivity. Akerlof 's data on bill posters and everyday ob- 
servation suggest that many workers do more than their jobs' stated re- 
quirements despite the apparent absence of pay or promotion incentives 
to do So. 4 If measures to prevent shirking by a few antagonize the many, 
these measures may be counterproductive. There are many things people 
will do if asked but refuse to do when threatened.15 
There can be no serious question that employers who  generate "good 
will" in the workplace are likely to enjoy greater productivity than those 
who  do not. Letting a small minority of miscreant workers go seems to 
be a strategy that deters shirking or theft more effectively than alterna- 
tive  approaches that are likely  to  give  more  offense  to  workers  who 
do not shirk. 
14 Titmuss (1971)  provides a dramatic example of how  partial reliance on pe- 
cuniary incentives can undermine "moral" behavior in the context of blood do- 
nations. 
15 A similar point is made by Carr-Hill and Stern (1979, pp. 294-95)  when they 
note: "Someone who is subject  to punishment he sees as unjust,  may be so embittered 
that he is more likely to offend than if punishment had been lower. Thus offences 
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IV.  Efficiency  Wages and Monitoring 
The foregoing arguments give some insight into the structure of firms' 
compensation arrangements.  Firms might find courts unwilling to enforce 
contracts involving large bonds, and large bonds might have counterpro- 
ductive effects on worker morale. Under these conditions, firms will expend 
resources  on monitoring and may find it profitable  to pay workers premium 
wages. In fact, two experts on private security and employee theft conclude 
that "the most important control against employee theft is a good salary 
or wage" (Lipman and McGraw 1988, p. 58). 
But this line of argument begs a fundamental question. If it is somehow 
efficient to give workers rents on the job for reasons of deterring shirking 
and crime or anything else, why do profit-maximizing firms not extract 
these rents up front from workers queued for such jobs? If the direct sale 
of jobs is somehow precluded, perhaps by legal restrictions, firms could 
surely find other ways of extracting some surplus from queuing workers 
by requiring  them to do menial work as a condition for attaining attractive 
jobs or by requiring them to purchase their own  uniforms or training. 
Such rent-extraction  strategies  would cause the reservation-wage  constraint 
(1c) to bind and so eliminate any involuntary unemployment or queuing 
even if explicit bonding or large punishments were impossible. 
This is the essence of the challenge to efficiency-wage theories put for- 
ward by Carmichael (1985) and Murphy and Topel (1987). The argument 
surely proves too much, for it appears to be empirically invalid in at least 
some circumstances. For example, most economists believe that minimum 
wage laws give rise to at least some job rationing. This prediction is sup- 
ported by data on job application rates analyzed by Holzer,  Katz, and 
Krueger  (1988). Arguments paralleling those of the efficiency-wage critics 
have been used to suggest that no queues should result from minimum 
wage laws because  firms fully extract  rents by adjusting  working conditions, 
training, or fringe benefits (e.g.,  Wessels  1980).  This does not  seem to 
happen. Nor  do ways seem to be found of dissipating all the rents and 
thereby eliminating the queues associated with  rent-control laws, price 
controls, or certain dramatic instances of the payment of efficiency wages 
(e.g., the Ford case documented in Raff and Summers [1987]). 
At least two different explanations can be given for why one does not 
observe all rents being eliminated, even where devices to do so are avail- 
able.16 First, firms may care about the ease with which they can recruit 
labor. Firms' ability to recruit labor depends upon the lifetime utility of 
the total compensation package associated with their job offers. Raising 
16 See Holzer, Katz, and Krueger  (1988) for a more detailed analysis of the factors 
determining  whether firms find it in their interests  to eliminate ex ante employment 
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lifetime earnings may increase the unobserved aspects of the quality of 
applicants (Weiss  1980) and increase the speed with which firms can fill 
vacancies (Lang 1988). Selling jobs may be unprofitable because it reduces 
the value of this package and makes it more difficult to recruit.  When rent 
extraction is inefficient, in the sense that more is taken from workers than 
is gained by firms, it particularly  may not pay because recruiting costs are 
likely to rise by more than the firm gains from rent-extraction activities. 
Second, it may be that the effort-elicitation considerations that shape 
compensation arrangements have both forward- and backward-looking 
elements. If workers' performance on the job depends not just on a pro- 
spective comparison of the compensation packages associated with current 
working and shirking decisions but also, retrospectively, on what surplus 
has already been earned, then it will not be profitable for employers to 
extract all ex ante rents from workers. In fact, Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler (1986) find that a substantial majority of surveyed households view 
the auctioning off of a job to qualified candidates as "unfair,"  and Akerlof 
and Yellen (1987) provide a wide variety  of evidence indicating  that workers 
often respond to personnel practices perceived as unfair through the re- 
striction of output. 
Loyalty as it is usually understood has a retrospective, as well as pro- 
spective, element. Strategies  such as "tit for tat,"  which seem to be successful 
in an evolutionary sense, involve conditioning behavior on one's partner's 
previous actions. Any such element in employees' effort decisions would 
militate against the collection  of up-front payments or the use of other 
similar devices to extract surplus. Means of surplus extraction that cost 
employees much more than one dollar for each dollar transferred  to the 
employer, such as requiring those who are about to hold responsible po- 
sitions to do menial work, are likely to be particularly galling and partic- 
ularly subversive to morale. In a similar vein, Okun (1981)  persuasively 
describes how firms' compensation policies during recessions are shaped 
by the need to maintain the loyalty of their work force when  the next 
boom comes. 
It is instructive  to contrast the labor market  and certain  product markets. 
Firms that rent bicycles, cars, or video cassettes wish to deter misuse and 
damage but are not  usually thought  to  create rents with  their pricing. 
Instead they rely on deposits. At least in part this is because denying future 
access to those who misuse products is likely to be difficult. On the other 
hand, landlords often price apartments  below the market to insure loyalty 
on the part of their tenants rather than relying wholely on a huge security 
deposit. Landlords do this because the threat of denial of future access is 
credible and because a tenant's "attitude" is important. 
These considerations hardly prove that firms pay efficiency wages, but 
they do demonstrate that a priori arguments ruling them out are inappro- 
priate. Employee Crime and Monitoring  345 
V.  Conclusions 
Employee crime provides a natural  testing ground for economic theories 
of principal-agent relationships. The compensation of top executives, as 
surveyed  byJensen and Murphy (1988), provides another one. Both suggest 
that compensation arrangements  are driven to a substantial degree by con- 
siderations that lie outside of those emphasized in conventional treatments 
of the economics of agency and incentives. These fairness considerations 
directly impinge on the structure  of compensation through firms' concerns 
with the impact of the perceived equity of their pay practices on worker 
productivity as well  as on their stock of public goodwill.  These consid- 
erations indirectly affect compensation arrangements  through legal restric- 
tions on the types of contracts that can be used to control employee cheat- 
ing. We suspect that future research in this area should focus on more 
extensive comparisons of actual arrangements  with those predicted by the- 
ory and with the elaboration of theory to cover the arrangements  we ac- 
tually observe. 
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